Tuesday, April 28, 2009 6:49:48 PM (GMT Daylight Time, UTC+01:00)
Message: Object expected
As this only really affects the refresh of the tree/close of a couple of dialogues I've not bothered fixing it but basically the issue is outlined well here: http://tinyurl.com/cx9atv
If you're using extension less URLs already then it's easy as pie to sort:
- Open your UrlRewriting config file (/config/UrlRewriting.config)
- Add this above "</rewrites>":
<...> <add name="missingjs" virtualUrl="^~/## YOUR ADMIN DIRECTORY GOES HERE ##_client/ui/(.*).js" rewriteUrlParameter="ExcludeFromClientQueryString" destinationUrl="~/umbraco_client/ui/$1.js" ignoreCase="true" />
If you've not already using extension less URLs don't panic, that's easy to setup you can read all about it here. Alternatively you could just copy the js files from one folder to another ;)
I don't know how many people already rename their admin dir from something else but as Umbraco becomes a more popular choice of CMS you really should consider hiding the folder (the more popular it becomes, the more people will become more familiar with the default admin directory of /umbraco/).
Although there hasn't yet been a breach (AFAIAA) if a vulnerability is found, the first step in prevention is obfuscation -hide your admin directory! A quick Google search will show you how easy some developers have made it for you to find their admin sites.
A seriously elegant SQL Injection -how it was sorted
Thursday, May 29, 2008 3:32:33 PM (GMT Daylight Time, UTC+01:00)
Doug Setzer posted this comment in response to my recent "A seriously elegant SQL Injection" post and I thought it may be of interest to others so have promoted it to a post...
Well, I'll step up and say that I am the "mate" who had this done. Tim's right - *always* sanitize your inputs. In my defence, this was a site that I inherited from a previous contractor. I'm not entirely absent of blame, I still should have done a security sweep through the code.
I'd like to document the steps that I went through once this was identified to try and avoid this kind of thing in the future.
- Edit every web page that executes a query to sanitize any parameters that are passed in. Since the site was classic ASP, I used my "SQLStringFieldValue" function:
- Modify the DB user account that is used to have *read only* access to the database
- Modify the pages that DO write to the database to have *read/write* access to the specific tables that are being changed. This limits the number of places that SQL Injection can occur to a smaller set than was previously possible. I still sanitize all of my input, but I'm extra spastic in these database calls.
- Add database auditing (triggers writing to mirror tables with audit event indicator & date/time) to see when data changes occur. This is still problematic with the pages that have "write" permissions to the tables, but again- that footprint is much smaller.
My future plans are to move to a view/stored procedure based architecture. I can then limit write permissions to just the stored procedures and read permissions to just the views. My grand gusto plans are to move to using command objects & parameters, but I'd sooner re-write the entire site.
Although Doug's attack wasn't the same nihaorr1.com attack that's going around atm it was similar so I would imagine other's will find this useful.
It still amazes me how many developers still fail to sanitise strings, only last week I came across another site (in PHP) that was allowing simple SQL injections to be used to log into their administration system. It was down to a problem with the sanitization string, but why not at least check your site before it goes live? It takes 2 minutes and even less to fix...
For those of you who need a few pointers, there's a good discussion or two about sanitising strings on the 4 Guys From Rolla site.